Not exactly at arm’s length: How South Africa’s Weapons Trade Undermines Its Stance on Israel and Palestine

By Ilham Rawoot, Michael Marchant, Ra’eesa Pather, Ariella Scher and Abongile Nkamisa

Also published in Africa Is a Country

South Africa’s foreign policy on Israel and Palestine is currently the most progressive and proactive in the world. South Africa has been one of the pioneers of the international fight for justice and liberation for Palestine, even taking Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and making a joint referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) within the last year. In October 2024, South Africa submitted a formal “Memorial” to the ICJ alleging that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.

Upon Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in 1990, one of the first leaders he met with was his close friend Yasser Arafat, who was at the time the President of the Palestine Liberation Organization. As part of this ongoing relationship between Palestinian and South African liberation movements, South Africa stopped all weapons sales to Israel in 2004.

The ban represented a radical break with the past. South Africa’s weapons-related relationship with Israel goes back many decades during the Israeli occupation and apartheid in Palestine that began with its establishment in 1948 when Zionists violently displaced Palestinians from their land in what is known as the Nakba (“Catastrophe” in Arabic). 

An investigation by Open Secrets in 2017 revealed more details about the long-standing, close relationship between Tel Aviv and Pretoria—an alliance that strengthened in the 1970s when the two countries clandestinely traded weapons. These activities amounted to sanctions-busting in a period where the United Nations (UN) had placed a compulsory arms embargo on apartheid South Africa. Declassified South African Department of Defence documents revealed that by 1975 South African state-owned weapons company Armscor officials set up a permanent office in Tel Aviv, allowing the South Africans to bust sanctions under the cover of diplomacy.

South Africa was Israel’s biggest weapons importer from 1977—the year of the UN arms embargo on South Africa—into the 1980s. Israel supplied artillery and ammunition, assisted the apartheid regime with its fighter jet program, and provided technological assistance on a range of other weapons technologies. Many documents about this collaboration in both South Africa and Israel remain hidden from the public in the respective countries’ state and military archives.

Despite South Africa’s now 20-year prohibition on weapons sales to Israel, things are not as clear cut as the South African government promises. In 2023, South African arms companies, with the approval of the South African government, sold arms worth R3.3 billion to countries that have been amongst Israel’s largest suppliers, including the US, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and France.

The US is Israel’s largest and most important weapons supplier, accounting for more than 60 percent of all major weapons imported by Israel. Germany is in second place and supplied nearly R20 billion worth of weapons to Israel between 2018 and 2022—around half of all EU arms exports over this period, according to the Transnational Institute. Germany, in turn, is one of the biggest importers of South African weapons, buying R1.7 billion in bombs, shells, and other technology in 2023, according to data released by the NCACC.

German exports to Israel surged in 2023, with most new licenses granted after October 7 (when Israel invaded Gaza). Germany even set up a working group to expedite weapons supply to Israel in this period. While exports from Germany have slowed dramatically in recent months following more evidence of Israeli war crimes, the German government has insisted there is no ban on exports in place and is deciding matters on a “case by case basis.”

South Africa’s Arms Exports to Israeli allies in 2023

The fact that South African-manufactured weapons are not directly exported to Israel does not mean they are not being used by Israel. There is a risk that South African weapons may be sold or transferred from those countries onwards to Israel, and used to kill Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the West Bank. If so, as we demonstrate below, the South African government does not have the requisite mechanisms to determine this; it would be none the wiser.

On October 7, 2023, Israel began its deadly offensive against the Palestinian people in Gaza. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF), with help from the US, Germany, and other suppliers of arms—launched a genocide against Palestinians in a disproportionate response to Hamas’ attacks on Israel.

While the UN officially records more than 40,000 Palestinians killed, this number does not account for the scores of people whose bodies have not been identified or who have not been found under the rubble of the Israeli attacks. The majority of Palestinians killed to date are civilians, including upwards of 17,000 children.

The Lancet medical journal reported that 180,000 Palestinians could be dead as a result of Israel’s relentless assaults, including the bombing of schools and hospitals, and the targeting of journalists and aid workers, all of which are violations of international law. 

Israel’s bombardment of Gaza and subsequent strikes in the region have accelerated an already huge demand for weapons from its allies, many of whom are supplied by South African manufacturers.

For South African weapons to be sold or transferred to another state, permission is needed from the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), the South African licensing body made up of several ministers. The NCACC is bound by law to consider the possible impact of any weapons exports on human rights and conflict and considers all applications on a case-by-case basis. It is also empowered to periodically reconsider exports in terms of licenses that it previously approved, which is particularly relevant where there has been a change in the circumstances of the end user.

The purchaser must provide South Africa with an End User Certificate (EUC), a critical tool that is aimed at determining where the munitions will end up. An EUC is a documented undertaking between a country selling arms and the purchaser of the arms. It effectively means that a purchasing country needs to agree that the munitions bought will not be transferred any further without the selling country’s permission.

However, the system within which the NCACC works is deeply flawed. Currently, it is based largely on trust in an international system of arms sales, purchases, and resales fraught with hidden purchases, and fraudulent reporting, with no monitoring, regulation, and inadequate follow-ups and accountability.

In its 2021 report Profiting from Misery, Open Secrets revealed the numerous instances in which South African weapons formally exported to the UAE were being used by local militias in Yemen. The UAE was one of several states, along with Saudi Arabia, to publicly refuse any inspections by South African authorities to monitor the terms of EUCs.

The NCACC and South African state bowed to these objections and removed the terms from the EUC that require states to accept inspections. Rather, its decisions appear to be based on good faith and reliance on the honesty of all parties that they are abiding by the relevant laws. To be clear, this problem is not unique to South Africa. The unauthorized re-export and transfer of weapons is a systemic issue in the global arms trade. 

In response to questions from Open Secrets, the NCACC says it is certain no weapons are sold on to Israel because it is:

aligned with International Law provisions that are aimed at ensuring that member states abide by the articles therein… importers of South African material respect international law and their obligations thereunder, so as not to supply Israel without South Africa’s consent. Facts to the contrary must still be proven.

The NCACC also has a history of failing to follow up on EUCs. In 2020, Cyril Xaba, then-chair of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, admitted in a Parliamentary hearing that the NCACC did not have enough resources to ensure that EUCs were always complied with or that exported defense equipment always ended up where agreed. “We rely largely on the media, or to some extent whistle-blowers,” he said.

The NCACC was also not reconstituted after South Africa’s national election in May 2024, until the announcement of the new members in October. Open Secrets has written to the Presidency to query the reasons for this delay and is awaiting a response. As such, the NCACC has not met or fulfilled any of its functions between May and October. As a result, it appears that any applications to export weapons in this period were decided on without the NCACC applying their mind to the risks, including possible new risks of diversion of those weapons to other end users. Moreover, in this period the NCACC could not reconsider exports in terms of existing licenses wherein the end user’s circumstances have changed. This is particularly significant in light of an ongoing war on Gaza and accelerating conflict in the region.

Even if South Africa’s weapons are not directly transferred on to Israel, they may well be used to refill the stockpiles of Germany and other countries that have supplied and in some instances are still supplying Israel with weapons. If this was the case, South African exports would in effect contribute to enabling Israel’s suppliers to continue arming Israel. 

In addition to the demand from Israel, the war in Ukraine has contributed to an artillery stockpile shortage in EU countries and the US. The US has admitted that it has had to redirect stockpiles of 155mm ammunition back from Ukraine to assist the IDF after October 2023. EU countries face similar problems.  In February 2024, German weapons company Rheinmetall wrote on its website: 

The Bundeswehr’s (German army) depots are empty; replenishing its stocks will cost an estimated €40 billion. Enormous consumption of ammunition in Ukraine is exacerbating current shortages. The western world’s available production capacity is not structured to meet demand on this scale.  Like other countries, Germany therefore plans to procure large amounts of ammunition over an extended period.

Rheinmetall said this after signing a contract with the German government to supply Germany with €8.5 billion ($9.2 billion) of 155mm ammunition—a type of munition that is a major South African export. Evidently, items procured from South Africa are being purchased to help replenish German and other stockpiles.

Rheinmetall has a South African subsidiary, Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM), which is subject to South Africa’s export laws. In July 2024, it was reported that RDM was:

running 24-hour-a-day shifts at its plants across South Africa and is investing hundreds of millions of rands in their expansion in order to keep up with the massive global demand for artillery ammunition. It is increasing capacity from 100 000 to 150 000 shells a year. 

Activists have been campaigning against South African businesses who support trade or donate to Israel either directly through the business or through personal donations of business owners, and they too have expressed concern about the functioning of the NCACC. 

Abeedah Adams, a member of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC), said that there is “secrecy” around whether South African arms end up in Israel “I know from my limited experience even when we try to monitor arms companies, that getting that kind of information is very difficult. I don’t think that we are complying and monitoring for example who’s the end user of those weapons,” Adams told Open Secrets. 

Adams said that all exports to Israel “fuel genocide,” making the campaign to boycott, divest, and sanction Israel necessary to prevent Israel from using South African goods to aid genocide against Palestinians. 

Na’eem Jeenah, a Senior Researcher at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, says the NCACC’s failure to track where South African weapons are used is troubling: 

The NCACC is a problem. For years now, it hasn’t operated in the way it’s supposed to and hasn’t done its regulatory function as it’s supposed to … It has a watchdog role and no weaponry should be exported from South Africa without it agreeing, and it doesn’t seem like that kind of regulatory function is happening. So, it’s a big problem.

Activists are also disappointed in the apparent inconsistency of the South African state in their efforts to pursue justice for Palestinians. As Jeenah points out:

South Africa’s case at the ICJ is founded on the Genocide Convention which makes guilty states that not only commit genocide, but also those that enable genocide. This means that when South Africa took that position, it should also clean up its own act. It’s one thing to say in the World Court that state A is committing genocide, but how principled is that if you are supplying them with the means for them to continue committing that genocide?

While it is leading the legal campaign to curtail Israel’s genocide in the international sphere, South Africa’s domestic conduct might well constitute a violation of the very Genocide Convention that it seeks to uphold. Until South Africa seriously reforms its approach to weapons exports and urgently strengthens the NCACC to fulfill its legal mandate, any stance it takes on human rights may be hypocritical.

Open Secrets submitted a request for access to records held by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) under the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA). This request sought detailed documentation, including recorded minutes of NCACC meetings, copies of all Contracting and Export Permits granted by the NCACC during that period for contracts involving Germany and the United States, End User Certificates (EUCs) for weapon exports to these countries, and any correspondence or documents related to the situation in Gaza. The NCACC refused to release any of these documents. Open Secrets has lodged an internal appeal in accordance with PAIA and is awaiting a decision.

Denel and Rheinmetall Denel did not respond to requests for comment.

The post Not exactly at arm’s length: How South Africa’s Weapons Trade Undermines Its Stance on Israel and Palestine appeared first on Open Secrets.

Even among Israelis, Sharon has long been a controversial figure. A career soldier, considered a brilliant strategist, but one with a history of insubordination, he brought to both his military and later political life a leadership style that would rightly be termed reckless, were it not so often rewarded with success. His place at the centre of almost every key military moment in Israel’s bloody second half of the twentieth century earned him the title of war hero, while his role in two civilian massacres (one of 69 people in a village in the West Bank in 1953, another of as many as 3000 in a Lebanese refugee camp in 1982) earned him the moniker of the ‘Butcher’. He was instrumental in developing the Israeli policy of guaranteeing swift, violent reprisals for any attack on Jewish life.

His subsequent political record is similarly divided. For his negotiation style, particularly as Minister of Housing in the 1990’s, he received another epithet – the ‘Bulldozer’ – before a stroke ended his career as Prime Minister in 2006.

While some South Africans have expressed their admiration for Sharon (who visited South Africa numerous times before becoming Prime Minister), there has been little reflection since his death on Sharon’s place in the relationship between the two countries, particularly during the highly militarised final decades of apartheid rule. The military alliance between the two pariah states was largely covert, but, according to reams of correspondence between the respective defence ministries, unreservedly supportive and warm. Sharon played a key role in keeping it so, going further than most in publicly asserting South Africa’s urgent need for more and better weaponry. There was a clear sense of parallel between the struggles of the Apartheid and Israeli states, and although many Israelis were at pains to maintain their ideological distance, Sharon was not among them.

Much of this is lucidly illustrated by Sasha Polakow-Suransky in his book The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s secret relationship with Apartheid South Africa. From 1977 (the year the UN apartheid arms embargo came into effect) into the 1980’s, South Africa was Israel’s largest weapons customer. This provided much needed foreign currency for the Israeli state in return for intelligence exchange, technology, ships and aircraft, and ultimately co-operation in the development of nuclear weapons.

“Geen doekies omdraai”

A surprising measure of Sharon’s controversial legacy is foreshadowed in a 1982 SADF memo to South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan, providing a CV and character assessment of his new Israeli counterpart.

The last of the document’s 9 pages, translated from Afrikaans, reads:

The document was declassified by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in 2006 and is available here [5,1 MB].

32. Background. Sharon’s behaviour should be carefully weighed. On the one hand, he is an impulsive politician apt to make drastic, far-reaching decisions on the spur of the moment. On the other hand, his reputation in dealings with other countries is highly impressive. He always maintains a cool head in the Knesset and largely succeeds in maintaining the image of an eminent politician and statesman. He succeeded, for example, in negotiating many positive and mutually acceptable measures with Egypt in connection with the withdrawal from Sinai. The Americans not only have great respect for him, but seem to like dealing with him. (His standing invitation to visit the US speaks for itself). Furthermore, it is clear that [then Prime Minister, Menachem] Begin trusts him to handle virtually all highly sensitive matters…
33. Guidelines. In light of the above, it may be desirable in dealing with Sharon to practise principled, honest position statements without offending him. A policy of “do not beat around the bush” seems to be his preference. Creating false hope/expectations that later turn out to be unfeasible, could be counterproductive. Sharon’s actions and methods should not be dismissed as irresponsible or impulsive as he has demonstrated on several occasions that he has qualities that can make him a strong leader in the political/diplomatic arena.”

The South African approach seems to have paid off and Sharon, like others in the Israeli military establishment, developed close ties with the apartheid securocrats.

Sharon secretly visited South Africa as Defence Minister in 1981 and spoke to South African forces along the border of Angola.[1]

South African troops had by then repeatedly invaded and commenced occupation in part of Angola – in support of the CIA-backed Unita rebel movement. Sometime shortly after that, Sharon visits Washington and according to a report by the New York Times:

Sharon, in company with many American and NATO military analysts, reported that South Africa needed more modern weapons if it was to fight successfully against Soviet-supplied troops.”

While a vast amount of money was wasted on weapons that were never used during the Cold War, various Southern African countries experienced real conflict. In August and September 1981, just as Sharon took office as Israeli Minister of Defence, the South African Defence Force invaded Angola in what it termed ‘Operation Protea’. This was by far the biggest battle in the war between South Africa and Angola resulting in massive bloodshed: almost 1,000 Angolan and SWAPO soldiers were killed while 10 SADF soldiers died. To achieve this, the regime in Pretoria mobilised 142 aircraft, including Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) used for reconnaissance.[2] These drones were developed in South Africa but based on similar drones purchased from the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI).[3] Some reports suggest that this was the first use of modern drones in military conflict.[4] The IAI Scout drone was subsequently deployed by the Israeli Military during the 1982 Lebanon war.

“…Wish to thank you for the friendly and understanding way”

Following the 1982 Lebanon War, mass protests in Tel Aviv led the Israeli government to establish the Kahan Commission, which found that Sharon, as Minister of Defence, bore “personal responsibility” for “the massacre by Lebanese militias of Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila”. The commission recommended that he resign, which Sharon did with great reluctance on 14 February 1983.[5]

Among, his allies, he could count on the apartheid regime.

Magnus Malan wrote a letter to Sharon two weeks later (2 March 1983), expressing:

regret of the circumstances under which you vacated the Defence portfolio and wish to thank you for the friendly and understanding way in which you have conducted matters of mutual interest between ourselves and our respective Defence Forces.”

Sharon responded on 20 April 1983 thanking Malan for his letter making the point that “I am sure that the understanding between our countries will develop for our mutual interest.”

There can be little doubt that this relationship between the apartheid military establishment and their counterparts in Israel did in fact deepen as a mix of money and ideology smoothed over other concerns. Israel was one of the most important allies in South Africa’s weapons procurement during the brutal years of PW Botha’s regime. However, Israel was by no means alone in selling weapons to South Africa – which many countries and corporations continued to do in contravention of international sanctions, earning a fabulous profit through inflated ‘premiums’. This is an aspect of history that many wish to erase.

The life story of men like Ariel Sharon and the ‘mutual interest’ shared with the South African apartheid are open secrets. They deserve far more attention if we are to fully understand the present.

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