News Newsletter

October 8, 2025

• 
  Nolwazi Nene
• 
  Mamello Mosiana

In 2024/25, Open Secrets’ work was broadcast, debated, and acted on, and it was sustained by the commitment and support of partners within civil society and on occasion by engaged state institutions. In this report we reflect on Open Secrets’ impact and achievements in the past financial year, measured against our organisational objectives. Read on and see what we got up to!

 

Read our 2024/25 annual report

We launched Who Owns South Africa? (WOSA)

We launched the first volume of ‘Who Owns South Africa’ (WOSA) at the end of August 2025. The System: Money, Power and Politics reveals how concentrated private wealth, oligopolies, and corporate dominance continue to shape South Africa’s economy and politics, and asks what this means for the struggle to end inequality.

At the launch, Mamello was in conversation with Michael Marchant, Head of Investigations at Open Secrets, Koketso Moeti, the Founding Executive Director of amandla.mobi., and activist Phindile Kunene. We also had various insights and contributions from key local civil society organisations.

For the second instalment, we turned the spotlight on to the role of private players in the health care system to show how the concentration of private power shapes the sector. Zen Mathe and Luthando Vilakazi were joined by Fatima Hassan, the founder of the Health Justice Initiative, in conversation with Open Secrets Investigator Luvano Ntuli.

Catch up on the discussion below!

Watch WOSA Private Healthcare

Access to Information Network

On 7 August 2025, the Access to Information Network (ATI Network) hosted a workshop and submission handover event, bringing together the Information Regulator, Information Officers from state entities, and member organisations of the ATI Network.

At a time when climate change and energy insecurity are urgent challenges in South Africa, access to information is a powerful tool. It enables the public to understand the intricacies of these sectors, scrutinise decision-making, and demand greater transparency and accountability from those in power.

The ATI Network compiled and submitted a report engaging with how our courts have interpreted and applied the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) in cases concerning access to information, particularly on energy- and climate-related information requests. The examples shared offer critical guidance on the proper treatment of access to information requests in the energy and climate space.

The ATI Network seeks to continue these engagements with the Information Regulator, with those goals in mind.

Read the submission here

MPs’ pension fund must come clean about investments in fossil fuel companies

Are MPs’ pension funds investing in an unsustainable future? Read the joint op-ed by Luthando Vilakazi from Open Secrets and David Le Page from Fossil Free South Africa discussing why we need to know whether our MPs are banking on fossil fuel companies to fund their retirement.

Read the op-ed

In the media

• WATCH | Who Owns South Africa? | The Dan Corder Show
• READ | Who Owns South Africa’ report points to ‘commodification’ of healthcare in private sector | Daily Maverick
• LISTEN | Open Secrets report: Who Owns South Africa – Private Healthcare: Medical Aid Schemes and Private Hospitals | SAFM
• LISTEN | Who Really Owns Private Healthcare in SA? A Deep Dive into Profits, Power & Inequality | KAYA 959
• LISTEN | HEALTH FEATURE: South Africa’s Healthcare Inequality | Power 987
• LISTEN | Open Secrets report reveals Who Owns SA – Radio 786
• WATCH |Open Secrets launches new investigative series – Newzroom Afrika
• LISTEN | Who Owns South Africa: The System – Money, Power and Politics – Creative Corner
• READ | Sapref for R1 – clean break for corporations, death sentence for communities
• WATCH | Worries over meaningful contributions at the National Convention
• WATCH | Refinery for R1 – Carte Blanche

July 28, 2026

Digital Profiteers (Part One): A peek behind South Africa’s digitalised grants system

June 23, 2026

INVESTIGATION | Who Owns South Africa? – Private Pensions

June 22, 2026

INVESTIGATION | Who Owns South Africa? – Private Health

June 8, 2026

Media Statement| Civil Society calls for urgent government action on NACAC anti-corruption proposals

April 17, 2026

2026 Open Secrets Internships

March 25, 2026

Open Secrets and SWISA submit Joint Report to the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry

The post Our Annual report is here! appeared first on Open Secrets.

Climate Profiteers News Open Secrets TV People's Hearing

August 30, 2025

• 
  Mamello Mosiana
• 
  Nolwazi Nene

In a country shadowed by smokescreens and broken promises, We Can’t See the Sunset is a haunting journey into the human cost of the climate crisis.

Through interviews with Open Secrets investigator Zen Mathe and testimonies from mining-affected communities, the documentary lays bare the corruption, exploitation, and corporate impunity driving South Africa’s environmental collapse.

Threaded through this stark reality is a dream sequence—an imagined future where the world has grown dim. Inside a cramped, dimly lit shack, a lone dancer moves with the weight of despair, while a fragile candle flickers against the darkness. This flame, fragile yet unyielding, becomes a symbol: the resilience of the people, the fight to protect what remains, and the mission of Open Secrets—to bring truth from the shadows into the light. Equal parts investigation and elegy,

We Can’t See the Sunset is a warning and a call to act. The horizon is fading. But the candle still burns.

Credits:

Directors: Cleveland Hopp and Nolwazi Nene

Producers: Mamello Mosiana, Nolwazi Nene, Cleveland Hopp

Director of Photography: Kwei Shun-Yu

Sound Design: Mayur Vallabhjee

Editor: Zukhanye Jacobs

Poet: Uhuru Phalafala

Interview: Zen Mathe

Dancer: Savannah Ashley

We Can’t See the Sunset premiered on the 14th of May 2025 at the 2025 People’s Hearing on Energy Profiteers

October 20, 2025

The cost of Eskom’s secret pricing deals | Currency News

August 18, 2025

Access to Information in the Climate, Energy, and Environmental Space

May 7, 2025

RSVP| People’s Hearing on Energy Profiteers- We Can’t See the Sunset

February 2, 2024

Coal’s deadly toll — Mpumalanga community members share their experiences of sickness and suffering

The post We Can’t See the Sunset Documentary Trailer appeared first on Open Secrets.

News Newsletter

August 1, 2025

• 
  Nolwazi Nene
• 
  Mamello Mosiana

Despite the relentless gloom of the news cycle, 2025 has brought meaningful strides towards justice and accountability.

The Dirty Dozen, the Twelve South African National Defence Force members were finally charged in connection to the assassination of Frans Mathipa. After years of pressure, the Presidency finally suspended Andrew Chauke, the unaccountable South Gauteng National Director of Public Prosecutions. In May, Open Secrets launched a case to review the NPA and Hawks’ conduct for failing to hold PRASA looters to account – in July, the Hawks raided PRASA’s Braamfontein offices. Things are moving and our work is having real impact!

Just last week, state capture profiteer Bain & Co announced that it would be shutting down its South African operations. The consulting firm could not survive the reputational damage caused by the overwhelming evidence of its complicity in state capture. This is a powerful reminder that exposés of  economic crime and corporate misconduct are effective means of accountability.

And just when we thought the good news couldn’t keep coming, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a landmark advisory opinion on climate change, affirming that states have legal obligations to protect the climate and mitigate its impacts.

So even when it feels like the world is falling apart and the rich and powerful remain untouchable, these victories are important reminders that change is possible. They are beacons of hope lighting the path to a more just world.

Your support makes this work possible

Here is your July 2025 newsletter, packed with updates and a recap of the waves we’re making together.

One step closer to justice for Frans Mathipa

Almost 2 years after the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Frans Mathipa, twelve SANDF members were arrested and charged in connection to the 2023 murder of the Hawks officer and other crimes. Open Secrets’ director Hennie van Vuuren states:

 

“The President needs to consider why the chief of the SANDF has done so little to tackle this — and hold him accountable. All of this underscores the extraordinary public importance of the prosecution of the SANDF’s “dirty dozen” and the work of the Hawks and prosecutors in bringing these matters to court…This represents a test for our democratic state and demands vigilance to ensure that all those implicated are held to account.”

In 2023, we partnered with Carte Blanche on a two-part exposé of the SANDF torture squad, the recent arrests of the dirty dozen prompted a follow up feature published in July this year.

Watch the Carte Blanche trailer

Hawks/NPA filing update

On 16 May 2025, Open Secrets filed an application at the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria to review the conduct of the Hawks and the NPA during their long-running investigation into corruption at the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA). The application asks the court to declare unlawful both the delay in finalising the investigations by the Hawks and the NPA, and the related failure by the NPA to decide whether to prosecute the perpetrators.

While the Hawks and the NPA have missed the 6 June 2025 deadline to provide a written record of the reasons behind the delays, the recent raid of PRASA’s offices give an indication of a move towards accountability. But we are not letting up. We need to establish why it has taken the state a decade to make decisions on PRASA corruption. We are considering all our legal options it is unacceptable that the tardiness of the Hawks and NPA continues to delay justice and accountability for state capture.

 

Read more

How Shell & BP walked away from a toxic refinery—and left South Africans to pay the price

In a two-part article series, Open Secrets investigators Michael Marchant, Cheriese Dilrajh and Luvano Ntuli explored the Central Energy Fund’s purchase of BP and Shell’s oil refinery in South Durban for R1.

• Read Part 1 | CEF ignores red flags and gives Shell and BP a clean-break on SAPREF deal
• Read Part 2 | The consultants who supported CEF’s SAPREF oil refinery gambit

State Capture Inquiry: Recommendations progress report

The presidency has finally released its progress report on implementing the recommendations of the state capture report. While the report reads as self congratulatory, what is the truth behind it all? Open Secrets campaigner, Letlhogonolo Letshele, breaks it all down in an op-ed for the Civil Society Working Group on State Capture (CSWG).

Read more

We challenged Eskom on “commercial confidentiality” and won!

An Open Secrets investigation revealed for the first time a massive ‘gift’ given by Eskom to JSE listed company South32. Documents given to us showed that South32’s Hillside aluminium smelter received around a 50% discount from Eskom that could add up up to R92bn over the life of the deal.

Eskom and BHP Billiton, from which South32 was unbundled, had cited “commercial confidentiality” for hiding this information. But we did not stop digging – and what we found makes it easy to see why they were so keen to keep the information away from the public eye.

Read more

2025 Publications

We Can’t See the Sunset

Featuring testimonies, activist guidelines, artwork, and reflections on climate justice, the zine amplifies the voices of communities most impacted by environmental harm and energy profiteering. It’s a creative call to action for a just transition rooted in dignity, equity, and collective power.

Download We Can’t See the Sunset

The Climate Consultants

Based on explosive insider interviews and hard-hitting investigative research, the report shines a light on the roles played by these consulting firms, and considers how we can hold these unelected private technocrats to account.

Download The Climate Consultants

#ShutdownsEverywhereYouGo

#ShutdownsEverywhereYouGo exposes MTN’s alleged role in enabling internet shutdowns, corruption, tax evasion, and enabling terror activities across Africa and the Middle East, highlighting its complicity in human rights violations.

Download #ShutdownsEverywhereYouGo

Did you miss one of the launches? Catch up on Open Secrets TV!

Watch

Partnerships/Collaboration

Open Secrets has joined a collective of activists, advocates, and researchers dedicated to advancing demilitarization worldwide. The call? Redirect at least 10% of military spending to fund care work, education, climate action, social protection, and community-based alternatives to violence.

Learn more about 10% For All

At the beginning of July 2025, Open Secrets and Fossil Free South Africa (FFSA) in an application lodged in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), asked the Political Office Bearers Pension Fund (POBPF) whether it invests in coal, oil and gas companies − the primary drivers of climate breakdown − and in companies supplying arms or commodities to regimes known to be abusing human rights.

Read our joint statement

In the media

• WATCH | Hawks raid Prasa offices in Johannesburg – Luthando Vilakazi on Newzroom Afrika
• LISTEN | State-owned entities and the question of accountability
• WATCH | Ramaphosa suspends Chauke – Ra’eesa Pather on Newzroom Afrika
• LISTEN | Why Andrew Chauke’s suspension from NPA is no surprise
• WATCH |SANDF Special Forces Arrested For Allegedly Murdering Hawks Detective – The Dan Corder Show
• WATCH |Management consultants cashing in on climate crisis – Newzroom Afrika
• LISTEN | Ra’eesa Pather on Power Business – How management consultants are cashing in on the climate crisis – report
• READ | Business Tech – New report reveals who is really making money through South Africa’s R1.76 trillion clean energy drive
• READ | Currency News – Consultants guzzle millions in just energy grants
• READ | The R74bn MTN lawsuit – a litmus test for corporate accountability – By  Jane Borman and Ra’eesa Pather
• WATCH | Newzroom Afrika – MTN probed for human rights violations in war-torn countries
• LISTEN | Exposing MTN’s Role in Internet Shutdowns  across Africa and the Middle East | Cape Talk

July 28, 2026

Digital Profiteers (Part One): A peek behind South Africa’s digitalised grants system

June 23, 2026

INVESTIGATION | Who Owns South Africa? – Private Pensions

June 22, 2026

INVESTIGATION | Who Owns South Africa? – Private Health

June 8, 2026

Media Statement| Civil Society calls for urgent government action on NACAC anti-corruption proposals

April 17, 2026

2026 Open Secrets Internships

March 25, 2026

Open Secrets and SWISA submit Joint Report to the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry

The post July 2025 Newsletter | Open Secrets contributes to 2025’s big accountability breakthroughs appeared first on Open Secrets.

Consultants downplayed previous warnings given to the Central Energy Fund about the purchase of Sapref’s oil refinery in South Durban, which has serious implications for the state and the public.

By Michael Marchant, Cheriese Dilrajh and Luvano Ntuli

First published in Daily Maverick

When the Central Energy Fund (CEF) purchased the South African Petroleum Refinery (Sapref) refinery from fossil fuel giants Shell and BP in May 2024, major red flags were raised about the viability of the purchase. CEF bought the refinery anyway, and on a problematic “clean break” principle.

This let Shell and BP off the hook for the significant environmental and other liabilities that come with the refinery. Now, CEF and the broader public are on the hook instead.

In the first article in this series, we showed that CEF’s decision to go ahead with the purchase seemed to ignore important parts of the due diligence that CEF initially received in 2021 and the risks that had substantially increased since the devastating floods in KwaZulu-Natal in 2022.

Read more: CEF ignores red flags and gives Shell and BP a clean-break on SAPREF deal

Now, we turn to the consultants that gave CEF advice and appear to have pushed the transaction over the line: CLG (formerly the Centurion Law Group) and Mazars. Their later advice downplayed previous warnings given to CEF about the purchase, which has serious implications for the state and the public. Given these implications and risks, the question at hand is why the board of CEF did not heed the earlier warnings. 

CLG and Mazars’ advice in 2023

The documents provided to Open Secrets by the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (Outa) reveal that CEF initially received advice from Mazars, the lead transaction adviser, as well as Ceris Engineering and law firm Fasken. Together, the advice highlighted the significant liabilities that any purchaser of Sapref would take on and warned against allowing Shell and BP to walk away without paying towards these. These were discussed in detail in the first article.

However, the transaction advice provided by Mazars and CLG after the KZN floods told a different story. For instance, the 2021 due diligence undertaken by Certis Engineering estimated decommissioning costs of the refinery were around $374-million (R6-billion).

Its advice was that “the Buyer [CEF] should ensure that at least $374m is provided for before giving the Seller a clean break” (emphasis added). The 2021 advice from Mazars also used this figure as the estimated decommissioning liabilities. In 2024, Shell and BP paid just R335-million to cover some employee and operational costs as part of the final deal and walked away with a “clean break”, exempting them from any decommissioning costs. 

We asked Shell and BP what they had estimated as the decommissioning costs of the refinery, as well as the amount that they ended up paying to CEF, but they declined to comment, citing confidentiality.

Without any explanation, the 2023 transaction advice from Mazars and CLG suddenly estimated that the total liabilities associated with the refinery were only R1.6-billion – including both soil and groundwater remediation, and decommissioning costs. There is nothing in the documents explaining how the full liabilities were now only around 25% of the initial 2021 estimates of only the decommissioning costs. We asked Mazars to explain the change in the estimates, but they did not respond to Open Secrets’ questions.

This is particularly confusing given the extensive damage done in the 2022 floods. However, using this figure allowed Mazars to state that the purchase would result in a net asset value (NAV) of R1.1-billion. 

The other notable difference in the 2023 advice from Mazars is that there is much less detail provided about the economic risks facing the future of the refinery sector, including the threats posed to its viability by the electrification of the transportation sector. This is a notable omission because, in the intervening period, the South African state had made new energy vehicles (NEV) a “priority area” in terms of South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP). The initial due diligence said any significant shift to NEV vehicles risked making Sapref a stranded asset very quickly. 

The advice received in 2023 aligned more closely with CEF’s existing narrative – focusing on the strategic value of reducing fuel imports to South Africa, noting that “opportunity has arisen [for CEF] to become an influential player in liquid fuels”. It repeatedly stresses the growth in fuel imports and the strategic importance of securing supply locally.

The document makes no mention of a 2022 warning from the South African National Energy Association (Sanea) that the arguments around security of supply were no longer applicable given the global refining market, also arguing that the refinery could become a stranded asset in as little as 10 years.

There were also apparent errors in the 2023 advice. For example, it stated that the refinery’s operations “currently contribute R45-billion to GDP” and “sustains 780 direct jobs” and up to 85,000 people through contractors, indirect, and induced jobs. It is not clear how these figures were calculated given the refinery had been shut down and underwater for several years. In fact, Sapref had undertaken mass retrenchments and no maintenance.

Yet despite downplaying the economic risks and talking up the future positive impacts of the Sapref refinery, even the 2023 Mazars/CLG advice did not totally ignore the risks of taking on the refinery’s liabilities on the “clean break” principle. It labelled the risk of this as “high” and noted that CEF should either obtain third-party insurance against possible future claims and liabilities or establish a dedicated separate fund for these future risks.

In line with the earlier legal review from Fasken, Mazars noted that one of these risks was class action claims in the future by communities near the refinery. It warned the CEF that the claims could be “exorbitant and far-reaching”, citing the R5-billion silicosis class action case that was settled in 2016 and noting that BP and Shell had refused to include these types of claims in the sale and purchase agreement (SPA).

Despite these warnings and the host of other concerns raised in the earlier due diligence, it was announced that CEF had purchased Sapref a mere month after Mazars and CLG presented this advice to CEF’s board in April 2024.

A problematic partnership seals the deal

There is one other notable way that the Mazars transaction advice documents from 2023 differ from those in 2021. At the end of the slides provided in 2023, there is a contact person listed from another organisation; CLG, formerly the Centurion Law Group.

The later transaction advice given to CEF by Mazars lists two contact people: Taona Kokera, a director at Mazars, and Oneyka Ojogbo, a director and lawyer from consulting firm CLG. Mazars acted as the lead transaction adviser from 2021 through to its completion, and there is only one other mention of CLG in the documents that Open Secrets has access to: in a number of comments made in track changes on the draft Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) between BP, Shell and CEF dated 2 May 2024, a couple of weeks before the purchase was announced. 

Founded by prominent oil and gas lobbyist NJ Ayuk, who has since stepped down as CEO, CLG is often referred to in the media as a “South African legal firm”. However, it is not registered with the Legal Practice Council and is more accurately understood as a typical professional services firm that provides a broad range of consulting, legal and other services under one roof.

CLG has 25 offices and more than 300 attorneys and “business advisers”, with major offices in nine African countries, including its Sandton office in South Africa. 

CLG describes itself as an “undeniable leader” in oil and gas development. Its office at Suite 43, Katherine and West, in Sandton, is the same address linked to the African Energy Chamber (AEC), where Ayuk is chairperson. The AEC is overtly an oil and gas lobby organisation aiming to attract investment and build capacity in the oil and gas sector across Africa and hosts the annual “African Energy Week” in Cape Town, focused on developing the oil and gas sector across the continent.

There is also a notable South African political connection in the AEC. Nosizwe Nokwe-Macamo is on the advisory board, and sits on the “Local Content Committee”, “Investment Committee”, and “Natural Gas Committee” of the advisory board. Nokwe-Macamo was the CEO of PetroSA for three years between 2012 and 2015, but was suspended and ultimately left after the state-owned entity posted a nearly R15-billion loss in 2015.

In 2024, she made a return to state-owned oil and gas when she was appointed by Gwede Mantashe to the board of the brand-new South African National Petroleum Corporation (SANPC). 

It is unclear when exactly CLG was contracted to work on the project, but the advice that it contributed to was certainly more supportive of the decision to purchase the refinery and more bullish on the future of the oil refinery business. Their advice on this transaction also overlapped with the period Mazars and CLG were giving dubious advice to CEF’s then subsidiary – PetroSA – on a separate oil and gas deal.

In February 2025, amaBhungane revealed that Kokera had led the Mazars team that gave the green light to three dubious deals between PetroSA and Gazprom, and PetroSA and Lawrence Mulaudzi. Mazars was brought on to advise on the deal in September 2023 and provided a final due diligence report in October 2023.

The due diligence labelled Mulaudzi as a “low-risk” partner, despite publicly available information that he had been involved in alleged corruption in his own business dealings. The PetroSA deal fell apart in June 2024 after Mulaudzi and EquaTheza failed to provide the R227-million that was promised. 

Mazars has come under fire for its involvement in this deal for several reasons. The final due diligence report it provided was insufficient and left out crucial details it had identified in earlier due diligence about the risks associated with Mulaudzi, his company Equator Holdings, and the financial and technical capabilities that EquaTheza had to take on a project of this nature. Mazars has denied any wrongdoing.

Additionally, Mazars was also accused of overcharging PetroSA for the work it did. Mazars had sub-contracted CLG in its work for PetroSA, and Ojogbo had billed as if she had worked on the project from 8am to 7pm every day of the week for two months, charging R4,160 per hour. PetroSA’s internal audit team alleged that Ojogbo and Mazars had engaged in “double dipping”.

PetroSA has since written to Mazars, demanding a refund of just over R1-million, but it is unclear whether this has happened. Additionally, the audit team raised questions around Mazars’ potential blacklisting by National Treasury for future business with the state if Mazars had, in fact, overcharged and underdelivered.

PetroSA’s internal audit team also pointed out that CLG had an obvious conflict of interest. In advising PetroSA, they would draft contracts and undertake due diligence on Mulaudzi and his companies. Yet Equator’s bid to PetroSA listed CLG as its partner. 

Mazars and CLG – led by Kokera and Ojogbo – were thus advising CEF on its decision to purchase the Sapref refinery at the same time as providing advice to PetroSA which has since been called into serious question.

Both Mazars and CLG failed to respond to detailed questions from Open Secrets regarding the due diligence, the discrepancies in the transaction advice provided to CEF in 2021 and 2023, and their views on the serious concerns raised by other firms in the due diligence process.

CEF board signs off and then stalls

Regardless of the motivations of those providing the advice to CEF, its board – chaired by Ayanda Noah – still had the responsibility to carefully apply its mind to all of the advice before making the decision to purchase the refinery and on what terms.

The scramble to create the South African National Petroleum Company (SANPC), a merger of CEF’s subsidiaries – PetroSA, Strategic Fuel Fund and iGas – to spur investment in the country’s oil and gas sector has also been a large factor behind the acquisition of Sapref. While it is speculative, it may be that the desire to rapidly consolidate the SANPC and expand its operations led the CEF board to gloss over the very real consequences of purchasing a defunct refinery, taking on its enormous liabilities and the myriad risks identified in the due diligence phase.

Despite the more positive tone of the later advice from Mazars and CLG, it still called for further due diligence and a “comprehensive review of financial records, legal documents and environmental assessments”. Crucially, the CEF board motivated to proceed with the sale just one month after receiving this advice, insufficient time for a further comprehensive due diligence process.

Open Secrets sent detailed questions about the transaction to both the Central Energy Fund and Department of Petroleum and Mineral Resources but received no response from either.

Since the purchase, CEF and the SANPC (now officially in operation and staffed) have argued that the rehabilitation of the refinery is the answer to national energy security and job creation. They have repeatedly indicated their aim to increase the refinery’s capacity from 180,000 barrels per day to 600,000 barrels (bbl) per day, to create a “mega-refinery”.  

Yet there is no sign of any progress in this regard. In fact, in February 2025 reports arose suggesting that the state was realising it could not afford to rebuild the Sapref refinery nor expand its capacity to 600,000bbl on its own. Deputy director-general in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources department, Tseliso Maqubela, and Minister Gwede Mantashe told Parliament in February 2025 that they were looking to regional partners – including Angola’s Sonangol or Botswana Oil – to help rebuild the refinery.

The state thus now sits with a defunct and out-of-date refinery with enormous social and environmental liabilities. It may not have the capital to get it going again, and even if it does, many experts suggest it will be a stranded asset in the near future. Its former owners, Shell and BP, have disappeared into the sunset. All the while, the communities of South Durban continue to bear the disastrous health costs and environmental devastation caused by the refinery

Open Secrets is a nonprofit organisation which exposes and builds accountability for private-sector economic crimes through investigative research, advocacy and the law. To support our work including the investigations that go into the Unaccountable series visit Support Open Secrets.

Read more profiles from the Unaccountable series here

The post Clean-break and Dirty Air (Part 2) | The consultants who supported CEF’s SAPREF oil refinery gambit appeared first on Open Secrets.

By Michael Marchant, Cheriese Dilrajh and Luvano Ntuli

First published in Daily Maverick

The Central Energy Fund’s purchase of BP and Shell’s oil refinery in South Durban will have far-reaching repercussions as the state assumes the burden of addressing its environmental violations and eventually decommissioning it.

In May 2024, the state-owned Central Energy Fund (CEF) announced that it would purchase the South African Petroleum Refinery (Sapref) oil refinery in South Durban – and all its related assets – for just R1. CEF says the deal is crucial to South Africa’s energy security and to “address the challenges in South Africa’s energy future”.

The reality is more complicated. The purchase – which releases previous owners BP and Shell from any responsibility for the refinery’s liabilities – will have far-reaching repercussions. The burden to restore the refinery, address its environmental violations and eventually decommission it, will all now fall to the state and the public.

In late 2024, Open Secrets was provided with a detailed complaint from a whistle-blower through the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (Outa) regarding CEF’s purchase of Sapref. The complaint included more than 1,000 pages of documents provided to CEF as part of the due diligence process prior to the purchase, as well as the details of the final sale agreement.

These documents reveal serious red flags about the purchase that CEF seemingly ignored, and that helps explain why Shell and BP were happy to walk away from the refinery for just R1.

This is part one of a two-part series that examines the purchase. This article examines the deal in detail, focusing on the warnings and red flags raised with the CEF between 2021 and 2024. The second part will focus on the advisors who worked on the deal, and the CEF board that approved it.

Sapref’s dirty history

Sapref has a long history of poor governance and environmental harm. Established in South Durban in 1963, the refinery was jointly owned by multinational oil giants Shell and BP until the sale in 2024. Residents of South Durban, which includes Bluff, Merebank, Clairewood, Umlazi and Wentworth, have long been subjected to unsafe living conditions due to the pollution from Sapref. The refinery also accrued significant environmental liabilities that have gone unaddressed for decades.

In 2015, the South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA) and the Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance (Veja) initiated legal proceedings to get the eThekwini Municipality to disclose atmospheric emission licenses and compliance reports of the Sapref and Engen refineries. Settler’s Primary School, which sits between the two refineries, reportedly had asthma rates that were among the highest in the world.

Pollution-monitoring company Ecoserv found that sulphur dioxide pollution in Merebank had exceeded World Health Organisation guidelines 124 times between 1 November 2000 and 31 October 2002, in a year where there was an overall decrease in sulphur dioxide pollution in this area.

The refinery has posed major health and environmental risks since its inception, including accidents and petrol spills, explosions and fires, and day-to-day poisoning of air, land, water and bodies. In 2018, the KwaZulu-Natal Environmental Outlook report declared Durban’s south basin an environmental “hotspot”.

CEF pursues the acquisition 

Despite this track record, the CEF and the then Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) first expressed interest in purchasing Sapref in 2021. It came at a time when South Africa’s refining capacity was severely constrained following the closure of several refineries. As a result, the country was (and remains) largely reliant on importing fuel. The SDCEA strongly opposed the purchase, urging the government to consult with all stakeholders before the purchase went ahead.

The CEF and the new South African National Petroleum Company (SANPC) have used the decline of refining capacity to motivate for the purchase. They argue that the rehabilitation of the refinery is the answer to national energy security and job creation.

Since the purchase, they have indicated their aim to increase the refinery’s capacity from 180,000 barrels per day to 600,000 barrels per day, to create a “mega-refinery”. This is strongly opposed by the SDCEA, which argues that ramping up refining capacity would severely worsen the already hazardous air pollution in South Durban.

However, the purchase also comes with immense risks. The documents provided to Open Secrets by Outa reveal that CEF obtained transaction advice and due diligence from several firms when considering the deal.

This included a “Financial Due Diligence” report submitted by Mazars, a “Technical Due Diligence” report submitted by Certis Engineering, and a “Commercial Due Diligence” report drafted by Kearney for Mazars and CEF. All were completed at the end of 2021. Legal firm Fasken also conducted a legal due diligence in January 2021.

Taken together, the reports expressed significant doubt about the financial and strategic value of CEF purchasing Sapref, especially if the sellers were to walk away from the refinery without any responsibilities. Ultimately, that’s exactly what BP and Shell did, leaving the mess for CEF to clean up.

To tell the story of the transaction, it’s helpful to follow in chronological order. First, we will discuss the red flags raised during the 2021 due diligence, and the decision in 2022 to proceed with the purchase anyway. Then, we show the impact of the catastrophic floods in KwaZulu-Natal in 2022 that put the whole deal on ice. Finally, we show CEF decided to push ahead anyway, and how the terms of the final sale agreement in 2024 let BP and Shell off the hook.

Red flags everywhere you look

The due diligence reports obtained by CEF in 2021 highlighted a host of serious concerns that can broadly be divided into decommissioning liabilities, maintenance costs, long-term profitability and possible civil liability.

1. Decommissioning liabilities – perhaps the most important factor in weighing up CEF’s decision to purchase Sapref is the liabilities it is assuming to ultimately decommission the refinery and its associated pipelines and infrastructure at the end of the refinery’s life. The National Environmental Management Act and its accompanying regulations require financial provision to be made for the costs associated with safely decommissioning and remediating any environmental impacts from, among other activities, oil refineries.

However, the Mazars financial due diligence from 2021 noted that Sapref’s owners had neither calculated nor made provision for end-of-life decommissioning, and that any new owner would probably be required to take on this significant cost. Both Mazars and Certis found that, at a minimum, a $374-million (R6-billion at the time) provision should be available to decommission the refinery and its “related onshore operations”.

The Certis report indicated that “robust negotiations took place to make sure that Shell and BP contribute to the decommissioning provision as good corporate citizens. It was proposed that a different approach be adopted to allocate the decommissioning provision equally between the Buyer and Seller, thus making each responsible for $187m”. By the time of the final deal, Shell and BP made no such contribution.

2. Capital spending needed for new fuel requirements – The Mazars and Certis due diligence highlighted legislation passed in 2021 requiring the move to significantly lower sulphur diesel production and use in South Africa. While this was supposed to be in force from 2023, it is now anticipated to come into effect in 2027. The due diligence estimated that between $545 and $1-billion (R8.7-billion-R16 billion) in capital expenditure would be required to upgrade the refinery to meet these requirements and stated that “exactly how this will be funded is not yet certain”.

3. Required maintenance spending – the due diligence noted that the refinery needed extensive maintenance. The Certis report noted that Sapref had planned an extensive maintenance and turnaround programme in 2022 and 2023 that would cost around R3-billion over two years. Mazars confirmed that there was extensive corrosion of the refinery tanks – creating serious risk of leaks – and that many machines in operation at the refinery were “not environmentally compliant”, increasing the risk of fines and plant shutdowns. The Mazars report also cautioned CEF that Sapref had been increasing maintenance for years but it had “not resulted in improved revenues or margins”.

4. Profitability and industry outlook – up until the refinery’s closure in 2022, Sapref had the capacity to refine 180,000 barrels (bbl) per day. However, the due diligence documents found that the minimum production capacity for a refinery to be profitable was 400,000bbl. Thus, it was anticipated that in addition to the required spending on maintenance and retooling the plant for cleaner fuel, it would need to expand its capacity significantly to be financially viable.

But Mazars noted the uncertain future for the market for petroleum products in the medium to long term, given the country’s climate commitments, the climate crisis and the proposed shift to electric vehicles and cleaner fuels. The documents concluded that the electrification of the transport sector is a “major long-term threat to refining”. It added that a pathway to adequately address carbon emissions would significantly reduce demand for petroleum in the coming decades, leaving “very few refineries profitable”.

When it was reported in early 2022 that CEF was interested in purchasing Sapref, the South African National Energy Association (Sanea) warned against it. Sanea said that it would cost more taxpayer money than it was worth to keep it operating, and that there was a likelihood that after spending that money, CEF would be left with a stranded asset in the next 10-15 years. Sanea’s CEO said: “Government is fixated with the idea that security of supply is linked to processing crude oil. That may have been the case several decades ago, but not any more”.

5. Possible civil liability – in the legal due diligence prepared by law firm Fasken, it warned that the Sapref refinery regularly violated South Africa’s air pollution limits and its own licence requirements, including regular flaring incidents and the release of SO2 (sulphur dioxide) at far above legal levels. The report also noted community complaints about the high levels of cancer in surrounding communities and the allegations that this was linked to the refinery’s emissions. The report noted that the CEF might find itself subject to criminal prosecution in the future if the refinery continued to contravene emission requirements.

Despite these concerns, then minister of mineral resources and energy, Gwede Mantashe, gave his approval for the deal in December 2021. At that point, the deal envisioned an “upfront acquisition cost of $10 million” to be paid by the CEF in cash, and that the CEF would raise a further $602-million in debt for required maintenance and inventory related to the refinery. This was R160-million in cash and R9.6-billion in debt in December 2021. By March 2022, a sale and purchase agreement had been drafted and edited by the legal teams for all parties.

Open Secrets sent questions to National Treasury, querying whether the CEF had provided it with all the required documentation for the acquisition under the PFMA and whether Treasury had provided the requisite oversight. Treasury’s response illuminated key issues.

First, it stated that sections 51(g), 66 and 70 of the PFMA, relating to the granting of a government guarantee, were not applicable as CEF was only purchasing the Sapref assets and not taking on additional liabilities, as originally planned. However, Open Secrets’ reading of the contract is that CEF did in fact take on additional liabilities, meaning it had done so without the government guarantee.

When we provided National Treasury with the draft sale and purchase agreement, it stated it had not seen the document and could not comment further.

Secondly, National Treasury pointed out that the CEF did not share additional information that Treasury had requested prior to the conclusion of the deal – this was pertaining to financial due diligence, the plans to decommission Sapref, and other operational costs. Treasury also requested engagement between itself, CEF and the DMRE on the status of the deal, but this engagement has not happened either. Both the CEF and DMRE failed to respond to Open Secrets’ questions sent to them.

The 2022 floods

April 2022 saw the most catastrophic flooding disaster recorded hit Durban: 459 people were killed and 88 were still missing by the end of May 2022; 4,000 homes were destroyed, 40,000 people were left homeless and 45,000 people were temporarily left unemployed.

The flood engulfed the Sapref refinery, leaving it under three metres of water, washing hydrocarbons on to surrounding beaches and mangroves, and causing “extensive damage to equipment and infrastructure, including plant, roads, IT systems, electricity and water systems”.  Sapref became inoperable at this point, and in April 2023, Sapref announced that it was retrenching half of its workforce, given the extensive damage to the refinery, adding that the damage required “intensive capital investment of about three-five years’ duration”.

According to the post-flood transaction advice document from Mazars to CEF, CEF visited Sapref in June 2022 to inspect the site and subsequently, all negotiations were paused. This arguably should have been the end of the deal, and the state should have required Shell and BP to fully clean up and decommission the site, bearing all the costs.

Instead, Shell and BP “returned to the negotiating table in November 2023”, and things moved quickly from there. A new MOU was signed by January 2024, and CEF had completed the purchase by the middle of 2024.

The final deal gives Shell and BP a ‘clean break’

The 2022 flood would have hugely escalated the risks and costs associated with purchasing the refinery. Given the risks identified in 2021, the flood would have increased the capital investment and maintenance requirements and increased local environmental damage and clean-up costs. It also meant that the R3-billion maintenance that Shell and BP had earmarked, could not take place.

Despite this, CEF pushed ahead with the purchase. BP and Shell were only too happy to give away the asset at this point, “selling” Sapref to CEF for a nominal R1. The only additional commitment from Shell and BP was to pay CEF R280-million to cover some operational expenditure in the first year after the sale, and R55-million towards employees.

It is clear from the final draft of the sale and purchase agreement and CEF’s internal correspondence provided to Open Secrets that the sale was based on a “clean break principle”, or voetstoots (at the buyer’s risk). In CEF’s board memorandum recommending the deal, it noted that, “Due to the clean break sale principle, the asset is sold to CEF on as is basis. CEF has to absorb all related liabilities link (sic) with asset”.

This was despite the 2021 due diligence which insisted that the CEF should only consider the deal if it could ensure a sizeable commitment from the sellers towards the massive future decommissioning costs.

This suggests that Shell and BP were the main beneficiaries of Sapref’s sale to CEF. They have walked away with indemnity from billions in liabilities – actual and contingent – associated with an out-of-date, environmentally non-compliant refinery that will cost billions to decommission. Those liabilities are now the responsibility of the state and the South African public.

Shell and BP declined to comment on the estimated costs of decommissioning, citing confidentiality.

The conclusion of the sale also occurred without public consultation with communities in South Durban who have been living with the environmental and health harms caused by the refinery for decades. The SDCEA told Open Secrets that they believe that this sale was a missed opportunity to move towards a “cleaner, renewable energy future” centred around environmental protection, public health and sustainable development.

The decision to push ahead with the deal raises important questions about who encouraged CEF to pursue the deal, and whether the board properly applied its mind to the totality of the evidence before it.

As we discuss in the next instalment in this series, CEF received slightly different advice in 2023 – after the flood – that seemed to downplay the previous warnings. This more positive advice was also provided by Mazars, but this time in partnership with a team from CLG, formerly known as the Centurion Law Group.

CLG is a prominent presence in South Africa’s oil and gas space and is linked to prominent oil and gas lobbyists. Mazars and CLG were also linked to another dodgy deal at PetroSA, a few months prior to its involvement at CEF, that has since gone completely belly-up.

Both Mazars and CLG failed to respond to detailed questions from Open Secrets.

The next article focuses on the role that Mazars and CLG played in the acquisition of Sapref, why the advice given to CEF suddenly changed after the 2022 floods, and the conduct of CEF’s board in approving the deal.

Open Secrets is a nonprofit organisation which exposes and builds accountability for private-sector economic crimes through investigative research, advocacy and the law. To support our work including the investigations that go into the Unaccountable series visit Support Open Secrets.

Read more profiles from the Unaccountable series here

The post Clean-break and Dirty Air (Part 1) | CEF ignores red flags and gives Shell and BP a clean-break on SAPREF deal appeared first on Open Secrets.

Motsweding FM

Kelebogile Kgetse o buisana le sebueledi kwa mokgatlhong wa baagi wa Open Secrets, Letlhogonolo Letshele ka tiro ya bathati ba puso ya GNU.

The post MOTSWEDING FM: BORESETSE: Puisano ka ngwaga fa e sa le go tlhamilwe GNU appeared first on Open Secrets.

OUTA – Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse

Think Parliament ends when the votes are counted? Think again. This sharp, no-fluff conversation, unpacks how citizen monitoring is shaking up democracy, and why Parliament is not the same thing as Cabinet (no, really – they’re different). Open Secrets Campaigner Letlhogonolo Letshele was part of OUTA’s webinar on International Day of Parliamentarism.

The post Webinar: Who’s watching Parliament? (Hint: It should be you) appeared first on Open Secrets.

PRESS RELEASE | Parliamentarians’ pension fund balks at transparency 

2 July 2025:

Fossil Free South Africa (FFSA) and Open Secrets express dismay and alarm at the refusal by the South African parliamentarians’ pension fund to divulge whether it invests in fossil fuel companies and in companies trading with human rights-abusing regimes, like Israel.

The Political Office Bearers Pension Fund (POBPF) is the fund in which the pensions of all members of Parliament and the provincial legislatures, including Cabinet members (except the President) are invested.

In an application lodged in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA), FFSA and Open Secrets asked the fund whether it invests in coal, oil and gas companies − the primary drivers of climate breakdown − and in companies supplying arms or commodities to regimes known to be abusing human rights.

Implications for responsible governance

The answers to these questions have “serious implications for responsible governance and our collective future”, said FFSA director David Le Page and Open Secrets lawyer Luthando Vilakazi. “The parliamentarians’ pension fund “should be held to a higher level of transparency than other funds in South Africa, given parliament’s responsibility for reigning in climate change and the stance it has already taken on Gaza.”

This includes South Africa’s effort to have Israel’s onslaught on Gaza declared a genocide by the International Court of Justice.

“If an MP’s retirement fund is dependent on the continuing profitability of fossil fuel companies, then not only is the Fund betting against a sustainable future, it simultaneously undercuts the responsibility of MPs to legislate for the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET IP)” says Vilakazi.

In its refusal, the fund is “wilfully interpreting its position in a blatant disregard for the transparency it claims as one of its founding principles,” said Le Page.

“Despite the Fund’s response we believe that the public interest override applies here considering the importance of transparency in ensuring accountability – particularly in climate-related issues and policymaking.” – Luthando Vilakazi

Publicly listed investments

In a written response for the POBPF, Jonathan Mort Inc. pension fund attorneys, said that our request did not meet the requirements of PAIA. “The Fund therefore denies your application as it neither indicates a valid right to be exercised or protected, nor how the information requested would assist the exercise or protection of a valid right.”

The POBPF’s investments are publicly listed in the fund’s financial reports. They reflect investments in a range of fossil fuel companies including Sasol, Glencore and Exxaro. These mostly appear to be of an order typical of South African pension funds, observed Le Page. “However, it’s not clear at all that the fund’s managers have ever applied their minds to the ethical issues involved in having these investments, and the conflicts of interest that arise for MPs.

“Of course, we would like all South Africans to pressure their asset managers to provide fossil fuel-free funds, and FFSA is working to persuade more asset managers to provide these. At the same time, the specific duty of MPs to act on the climate crisis gives them special responsibilities.

The POBPF’s declared Investment Strategy includes the commitment to an ethical approach to investments: The Fund’s investments should be managed in a manner that is “honest, transparent and ethical,” it states.

As things stand, it seems that parliamentarians do indeed benefit from investments in the fossil fuel industry; one whose emissions and pollution costs South Africa over R500 billion annually, added Le Page and Vilakazi.

Background:
FFSA is a non-profit organisation and network of South Africans working to secure human rights and prosperity by challenging financial and social support for the fossil fuel industry.
They are part of a growing international divestment movement. In response to the accelerating climate emergency and the continued failures by world governments to adequately regulate the fossil fuel industry, the global divestment movement has expanded to over 1667 institutions with $40,6 trillion in assets under management, including universities and cities around the world.
These include Oxford, Cambridge, Yale and Harvard Universities, Ireland, and the cities of New York, London, Paris, Melbourne, Cape Town and eThekwini, amongst many others.
In March 2022, FFSA won their long-standing campaign with students for the University of Cape Town to divest from fossil fuels.

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Open Secrets is a non-profit organisation which exposes and builds accountability for private-sector economic crimes through investigative research, advocacy and the law.

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eNCA |The Dan Corder Show

Star guests on The Dan Corder Show are Hennie van Vuuren from Open Secrets, talking about the high-profile arrests of SAPS, spoeks and soldiers, and Lelowhatsgood on South Africa’s vibrant queer culture.

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Today, 26 June 2025, Open Secrets launches its latest report, The Climate Consultants. The investigative report reveals how management consultants are cashing in on the climate crisis, with a focus on South Africa’s climate and just energy transition space.

Management consultants and institutions linked to donor countries receive the lion’s share of the grant funding for South Africa’s just transition. Around 65% of the committed grant funds have gone to private corporations and organisations as implementing entities. Less than 25% of the grant monies go to local implementing entities, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs), public sector entities, and universities. Often, there is also a direct link between where the money comes from (the donor country) and where the money goes (the implementing entity).

As a result, consulting firms are playing a fundamental role in shaping South Africa’s response to the climate and energy crises, whether it is in their work for South Africa’s largest fossil fuel companies and banks, or for public institutions and government. They do so despite serious conflicts of interest.

Management consultants have permeated every sphere of activity of government and the private sector. Yet, they are regularly implicated in scandals and wrongdoings and enabling grand corruption and state capture.  These scandals reflect a systemic and sinister problem in the industry – they operate behind a veil of secrecy with little to no accountability.

Zen Mathe, Investigator at Open Secrets and co-author of the report says that: “Open Secrets believes that it is vital to shine a light on the roles played by these consulting firms and to critically assess their impact on South Africa’s pursuit of a just transition. The country’s recent experience of the devastating complicity of major consulting firms like McKinsey and Bain in state capture—and their refusal to take genuine responsibility for the harm done – is an ever-present reminder of why we must scrutinise the role of consultants, especially when they have an influence on issues of fundamental public interest and importance”.

Micheal Marchant, Head of Investigations at Open Secrets and co-author of the report further says that: “The central role of management consultants in providing advice on our energy transition is a fundamental threat to our democracy. In part, this is because of the absence of any transparency in how management consultants work, and how this secrecy breeds impunity. But it is also because the state’s reliance on consultants undermines state capacity in the long-run and allows the capture of policy spaces by corporate interests that are intimately tied to fossil fuel interests. Where the voices and interests of the public are sidelined, the risk is heightened”.

Given their track record and modus operandi in South Africa and elsewhere, it is concerning that private consultants have been given the opportunity to corner the market for advice on the climate crisis and a just transition with little scrutiny. The climate crisis and how we address it is one of the most urgent and defining issues of our time.  South Africa is the first Global South country to conclude a formal Just Energy Transition Partnership agreement with international donors, yet policy responses and regulations are increasingly being shaped by management consultants who see this as a new frontier for profit taking.

The report spotlights the roles played by these consulting firms, and highlights that there must be public debate about how we hold these unelected private technocrats to account. We must critically assess their impact on South Africa’s pursuit of an energy transition that is just and benefits the most vulnerable and immediately affected members of society.

Download the report here

For media inquiries or interview requests, please contact: Letlhogonolo Letshele, Campaigner, lletshele@opensecrets.org.za – Tel +27725650173

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